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Summary
The poultry epidemic of H7N7 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus in
the Netherlands in 2003 was probably the result of the introduction of an 
H7N7 low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) virus (by interspecies transmission
from wild birds) and the subsequent intraspecies transmission of this virus in
poultry. The intraspecies transmission of the ensuing H7N7 HPAI virus was very
successful both within and between flocks. Consequently, in the two poultry-
dense areas that were affected, the epidemic could only be stopped by
eliminating all poultry in the region. According to the spatial models these are the
only areas where this was the case in the Netherlands. There was also
interspecies transmission to mammals, i.e. to pigs and to humans. For pigs it was
shown that possible subsequent intraspecies transmission was negligible
(R0 < 1). With hindsight the same was probably also true for humans.
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Introduction
From February 2003 to May 2003 an epidemic of 
H7N7 highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus
occurred in the Netherlands (22). The epidemic started in
one of the most poultry-dense areas of the country and
later spread to another poultry-dense area. The cause of the
epidemic was believed to be the introduction of a low
pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) H7N7 virus which
evolved during transmission in poultry to become highly
pathogenic (11, 20).
In the course of the epidemic, both of the poultry-dense
areas were depopulated of poultry by the culling of all
birds on infected premises, the pre-emptive culling of all
birds on contiguous farms, and the culling of all off-farm
poultry in the contiguous area.
The epidemic in the larger of the two areas consisted of 
212 infected premises and the epidemic in the smaller area
consisted of 43 infected premises. The number of farms on
which birds were pre-emptively culled, not counting
locations where poultry were kept for non-commercial
purposes, was five times the number of infected farms.
One person handling infected poultry during the epidemic
became fatally ill and was later diagnosed as having been
infected with a similar H7N7 virus (16). In addition,
several cases of conjunctivitis in humans occurred (16) and
workers and some of their family members tested
seropositive (18).
The authors give an overview of the investigations carried
out into this epidemic. Data and samples were collected
before and during the epidemic and both epidemiological
and virological techniques were employed. Investigations
focused on the following: 
– possible intraspecies transmission of similar H7N7 LPAI
virus among wild fowl and interspecies transmission from
wild fowl to poultry
– intraspecies transmission of H7N7 HPAI viruses in
poultry
– further interspecies transmission of H7N7 HPAI virus to
mammals, and the possibility of intraspecies transmission
of this virus in these mammals.
Interspecies transmission 
of H7N7 low pathogenic avian
influenza virus to poultry
Isolates of the LPAI precursor of the Dutch H7N7 HPAI
virus have not been reported: not from wild birds prior to
the epidemic or from poultry during the epidemic.
Nevertheless, circumstantial evidence strongly suggests a
wild bird origin, as follows:
– introductions of LPAI into poultry appeared to be
sufficiently common in the Netherlands in 2003 (11)
– transitions from LPAI virus to HPAI virus have been
documented (2, 8, 23)
– related H7 and N7 genes were found among the isolates
obtained from two different mallard ducks in the
Netherlands in 2000 (16).
The last point, that is, the finding of similar genes albeit in
viruses from different animals, makes it reasonable to
suppose that a similar LPAI H7N7 virus could have
circulated among mallard ducks.
It is also reasonable to suppose that introduction of LPAI
viruses does occur, as it was shown serologically that other
LPAI viruses had been introduced into poultry farms in
2003 (11). A serological survey of all poultry farms found
antibodies against avian influenza at three locations
outside of the HPAI epidemic areas (11). One location
consisted of a cluster of three poultry farms. From diseased
turkeys on one of these three farms an LPAI H7N3 was
isolated (30). The viruses introduced into the other two
locations could not be subtyped, but were neither H5 nor
H7 and thus, according to current knowledge, they could
not have developed into epidemics of HPAI virus in
poultry (1). 
The findings of de Wit et al. (11) on the number of
introductions of LPAI have led to the following
recommendations: 
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– to better monitor the situation with regard to the
introduction of LPAI by serological sampling
– to better monitor the possible emergence of a new HPAI
by applying polymerase chain reaction (PCR) methods to
detect avian influenza in poultry after excessive mortality. 
Based on the data from the infected farms during the 2003
epidemic it was found that excessive mortality is indeed
the best indication of HPAI virus circulation in poultry
(13). Later, Elbers et al. (12, 14) refined this finding to
establish notification thresholds for poultry. In poultry
flocks with animals less than 11 weeks old it is, for
example, compulsory to notify the veterinary authorities
when the mortality exceeds 0.5% on two consecutive days;
the set threshold mortality level is higher for turkeys and
lower for caged layer birds.
Furthermore, the conclusion that LPAI is probably
introduced into poultry from wild birds has led to
recommendations to reduce the opportunities for contact
between poultry and wild birds. To that end, it is now
compulsory in the Netherlands to keep poultry indoors
during an epidemic and during periods and in areas where
the possibility of introduction is thought to be high.
For a virus to be able to have continued transmission it is
necessary that on average each infected host infects more
than one other host. The average number of hosts infected
by one typical infected host is called the reproduction ratio
(R0) (Rh indicates the average number of secondary infected
herds/flocks caused by one infectious herd/flock). Thus 
R0 > 1 implies that there can be prolonged transmission.
When an LPAI virus is newly introduced into poultry it
cannot always transmit sufficiently, which is not surprising,
because, as with any introduction into a new bird species,
the virus has not yet adapted. It is important to note that
apart from ducks, poultry species are not closely related to
the wild bird species that carry the LPAI viruses (15). Even
introductions that did lead to transmission, i.e. infection of
more than one bird in the poultry flock, were often self-
limiting and did not spread beyond the flock. 
Thus, introductions of LPAI viruses do probably occur
regularly, but many of these introductions into poultry
remain a minor outbreak, in terms of either the number of
birds or the number of farms. In other words, the
reproduction ratio of newly introduced avian influenza
viruses is often below one, either at the between-bird or at
the between-farm level. This was reflected in the
monitoring of LPAI in the Netherlands in 2003 (11). Of the
four known introductions with subsequent transmission in
that year, two stopped within the farm, the one with H7N3
virus stopped between farms (30), and only the H7N7
virus caused an epidemic after mutating to high
pathogenicity. 
In the epidemic of 2003, the circulation phase of H7N7
LPAI virus was probably limited. On one of the first
detected farms there was also one flock with H7
seropositive poultry which may be an indication of the
transmission of H7N7 LPAI virus into that flock. If that
were true, it could be that that farm was the index farm.
In the literature there are different accounts with respect to
the duration of LPAI virus circulation before HPAI virus
occurs. Sometimes short periods are mentioned, for
example in Chile with H7N3 (23), and sometimes longer
periods are recounted, for example, in Pennsylvania with
H5N2 (2) and in Italy with H7N1 (8).
The supposed origin of HPAI viruses implies that during an
early period both LPAI and HPAI viruses occur together
and, thus, that there will already be cross-immunity against
HPAI virus in some birds, in which the HPAI virus will
continue to replicate, or attempt to replicate, after
transmission. It has been shown experimentally that
immunity against the related LPAI virus can prevent the
infection and transmission of the descendant HPAI virus
(26, 28). Such cross immunity may explain why the flock
of H7 seropositive hens mentioned above did not
experience high mortality despite being next to a flock in
which high mortality was occurring as a result of HPAI
H7N7 virus infection. With cross immunity and initial
occurrence in the same animal population the HPAI virus
can only take over when the transmission of the HPAI virus
is faster than the transmission of the LPAI virus. For the
HPAI virus to give rise to an epidemic, the resulting
reproduction ratio both within herds and between herds
has to be higher than one. 
Intraspecies transmission of
H7N7 highly pathogenic avian
influenza virus in poultry
The H7N7 HPAI virus that occurred in the Netherlands in
2003 transmitted very successfully both within chicken
layer flocks and between these layer flocks. The within-
flock transmission was fast. Depending on assumptions, it
was estimated as follows:
– 4.5 days–1 (95% confidence interval 2.7 to 7.6)
assuming no latent period
– 19.9 days–1 (95% confidence interval 11.7 to 33.8)
assuming a latent period of one to two days (6).
The latter estimate is in accordance with experimental
transmission of this H7N7 HPAI virus in groups of
chickens (27). 
Rapid mortality accompanying infection limited the level
of the reproduction ratio. However, from the estimates of
Bos et al. (6) it can be seen that even with a high mortality
rate, and hence a short survival period, the reproduction
ratio within herds is well above one. Massive mortality
within the infected flocks occurs within one to two weeks
after introduction of the virus (7, 22).
For the purposes of epidemic control it is also important to
quantify the transmission between flocks. Stegeman et al.
(22) provided an estimate of the transmission between
flocks without using the spatial location of the cases in the
analysis. Before the control measures were introduced a
flock was infected for 13.8 days and its reproduction ratio
was estimated as Rh = 6.5 (95% confidence interval 3.1 to
9.9) (22). 
The control measures implemented included enhanced
biosecurity measures such as transport limitations in the
surveillance zone, and cleaning and disinfection
requirements for those contacts that were permitted. All
infected premises were depopulated and there was extra
effort to find and diagnose infected premises. In addition,
all neighbouring farms and dangerous contact farms were
also depopulated. This resulted in a reduction in the
infectious period of infected farms to 7.3 days in the first
affected area. As a consequence (22), the reproduction
ratio (the number of new cases per infected farm) was
reduced from the previously mentioned 6.5 to 1.2 (95%
confidence interval 0.6 to 1.9). 
An attempt was made to identify risk factors for
introduction of HPAI into poultry farms (24). The only risk
factor found was a higher risk for poultry farms having
layer hens versus farms having other poultry. The
difference is attributed to the fact that layer hen farms have
more contacts than other poultry farms. Alternatively, layer
hen farms may have more contacts with other layer hen
farms than with other poultry farms. In either case, further
analysis is needed to confirm this hypothesis. 
Even after implementing all control measures the
reproduction ratio between flocks was above one, which
implied that the epidemic was not terminated by the
control measures. The epidemic only seemed to have
stopped because the boundaries of the poultry-dense area
were reached. The same epidemic pattern was observed
after the introduction in the other poultry-dense area in the
Netherlands. In this area the reproduction ratio between
farms was initially 3.1 and after implementation of all the
control measures it dropped to 1.2. Again, the epidemic
seemed to have stopped only because the boundaries of the
area were reached (22).
Given this conclusion, the spatial analysis of the
transmission between farms was important; the question
being, to what extent transmission depended on the
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density of the poultry farms in an area during this
epidemic. The analysis of Boender et al. (5) showed that
the density of poultry farms in the two epidemic areas
could indeed explain the observed patterns. The two
infected areas were the only areas in which the
reproduction ratio between farms, even with control
measures, was above one. In contrast, in all other areas in
the Netherlands the reproduction ratio was below one,
even without control measures, again according to the
model (5). 
In the poultry-dense areas, control was thus not possible
without culling almost all poultry in the area. Gassing the
whole hen house with carbon dioxide proved to be the
most efficient and humane manner of killing poultry on
farms with large numbers of chickens (17).
Inter- and intraspecies
transmission of H7N7 highly
pathogenic avian influenza virus
in mammals
Infection of mammals is of concern, particularly when
transmission among these mammalian hosts occurs.
Moreover, transmission among mammals other than
humans heightens the concern that humans may also
become infected and diseased. Before the Dutch H7N7
virus epidemic in poultry, isolation of H7 viruses from
humans, seals and horses had been reported (21). In
humans, infections with H7 viruses have caused
conjunctivitis, but also influenza-like illnesses such as mild
respiratory disorders. 
To find infections with the H7N7 virus in mammals, virus
isolation and serology can be employed. Whereas virus
detection by isolation or PCR provides evidence of at least
exposure of the mammalian host to the virus,
interpretation of serology is difficult in the absence of other
research validating the serological test, i.e. verifying the
correlation between infection and serology. 
During the epidemic in the Netherlands, pigs were
reported to be seropositive for H7 antibodies (19). These
pigs were found only on mixed farms (poultry and pigs),
where the poultry was infected. No virus was isolated and
no clinical signs were seen and there were no indications
that there were infected pigs in other herds. It was
concluded that all the pigs must have been directly
exposed to the virus from the poultry, but that no further
transmission occurred. 
Experimentally, the virus did not transmit to contact pigs
in a setting where 20 inoculated pigs were placed together
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with 20 contact animals (19). Based on the data reported
in Loeffen et al. (19) the estimated reproduction ratio for
this H7N7 virus in pigs was R0 = 0.0 (95% confidence
interval R0 ≤ 0.32).
Cases of conjunctivitis in humans also occurred during the
epidemic. In several instances the H7N7 HPAI virus was
also isolated from these human conjunctivitis cases (16).
Serological positive results in people other than those
presenting with symptoms also occurred, indicating that
more workers may have been exposed or possibly infected
(18). Thus, interspecies transmission to humans had
occurred (16, 18). Moreover, in some humans, clinical
disease was observed and one person became fatally ill
(16). Based on further analysis of the serological data (18)
it was concluded that intraspecific transmission from these
infected humans to other humans could also have occurred
(18, 25). 
Virus isolates both from a human conjunctivitis case
(A/NL/230/03) and from the human fatal case
(A/NL/219/03) were studied using animal models. First it
was shown that in Balb/c mice the virus from the fatal case
(NL219) was highly virulent (10). Similarly, Belser et al. (4)
showed that NL219 was highly virulent for both mice and
ferrets (4). In addition, Belser et al. (4) found that the other
Dutch virus isolate (NL230), the one isolated from a
conjunctivitis case, was much less virulent for mice and
ferrets.
The same two H7N7 virus isolates from human cases were
also tested for their ability to transmit in mammals (3).
Belser et al. (3) used the ferret transmission model as a
model to study potential differences in the transmission of
these viruses among humans. Having found a difference in
transmission among ferrets they looked at underlying
genotype and phenotype differences in the viruses to see if
they could be responsible for that difference in
transmission. Belser et al. (3) observed that the NL219
transmitted less well in ferrets (0 out of 3 contact animals
infected) than did the NL230 isolate (2 out of 3 contact
animals infected). The experiment with NL230 was
repeated and gave the same result. 
Looking at their data (3) from the perspective of
quantifying the transmission of the viruses (9), one can
extract estimates of the underlying transmission
parameters for the two isolates in ferrets. For NL219 the
reproduction ratio estimate is R0 = 0 (95% confidence
interval R0 < 3.4) and for isolate NL230, based on two
replicate experiments, R0 = 1.5 (95% confidence interval
0.36 to 9.2). According to statistical inference based on the
models (9) these two isolates show in this experimental
set-up no significant difference in transmission parameters
for ferrets. This remains true when the experiment with the
NL219 isolate is repeated and gives the same result as
before (Table I).
Findings
An outbreak with the H7N7 HPAI virus was impossible to
control with biosecurity and culling of infected poultry in
those areas where the density of poultry farms was too high
(5). 
The transition from LPAI virus to HPAI virus has most
probably taken place in poultry. Thus, circulation of H7
LPAI viruses in poultry must be seen as a risk for HPAI
virus outbreaks. 
Infection in humans with an H7 virus is possible and can
lead to lethal disease.
Intraspecies transmission in mammals did not occur
during this epidemic (R0 < 1).
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Concluding remarks
Methods
In this paper the authors looked at the epidemic of H7N7
in the Netherlands in 2003 using a combination of
observational data, experimental data and quantitative
methods (9).
The key element in this approach is the transmission
parameters that summarise the transmission characteristics
of the different virus isolates in different host species.
Quantitative knowledge with respect to transmission
parameters provides a basis for controlling epidemics and
for testing control measures (27, 29).
Transmission parameters can be estimated both from
experiments and from observed chains of infection.
Comparison of these estimates can give insight into the
dynamics of the virus, e.g. the differences in transmission
in pigs as observed in the field and in experiments.
It is therefore advised that, in addition to good field
observations, properly designed experiments are carried
out and are statistically analysed.
Table I
Significance levels for some transmission experiments
To test whether two experimental set-ups (for example two different host species, two different virus isolates or two different vaccines) yield
different results with respect to transmission, the difference in the number of contact infections is documented. The probability (p) that the observed
difference or an even more extreme difference can occur is then calculated assuming the two set-ups are identical (‘null hypothesis’). These p values
are given in the Table for different experimental designs each with two experimental set-ups and different observed differences. The observed
difference is the difference in the number of animals which become infected in the two set-ups. It is thus assumed that the observed number of
infected contact animals is identical for both groups using the same experimental design as given in the first column. The design is a group of
animals with S susceptible animals and I infectious animals repeated n times coded in the Table as n × (S,I) (the p values were calculated using
methods described in de Wit et al. [10] and van Boven et al. [25]). For example, when each parameter is tested with one experimental group of 3
susceptible animals and 3 infectious animals the maximum difference in outcome is 3 (in one set-up all infected and in the other none). In that case
the Table provides us with a p-value of 0.060, which means not significant
Experimental design
Difference observed
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 × (3,3) n.s. 0.375 0.182 0.060
2 × (3,3) n.s. 0.413 0.254 0.133 0.056 0.018 0.0036
1 × (5,5) n.s. 0.411 0.251 0.130 0.053 0.013
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La transmission intra et inter-espèces du virus H7N7 de l’influenza
aviaire hautement pathogène lors de l’épizootie d’influenza aviaire
survenue en 2003 aux Pays-Bas
M.C.M. de Jong, A. Stegeman, J. van der Goot & G. Koch
Résumé
L’épizootie d’influenza aviaire hautement pathogène (IAHP) due au virus H7N7
survenue aux Pays-Bas en 2003 est probablement le résultat de la transmission
inter-espèces d’un virus de l’influenza aviaire faiblement pathogène (IAFP) à
partir d’oiseaux sauvages vers les populations de volailles domestiques, suivie
de la transmission intra-espèce du virus chez ces dernières. La transmission
intra-espèce du virus H7N7 (devenu hautement pathogène) a abouti facilement,
aussi bien entre troupeaux qu’à l’intérieur d’un même troupeau. De ce fait, dans
les deux zones affectées qui comportaient une forte densité avicole, l’élimination
de toutes les volailles était la seule solution permettant d’endiguer l’épizootie.
D’après les modèles spaciaux, cette solution n’a été pratiquée que dans ces
deux zones aux Pays-Bas. Il y a eu également des cas de transmission inter-
espèces au porc et à l’homme. Il a été établi que la transmission ultérieure intra-
espèce a été négligeable chez le porc (R0 < 1). Rétrospectivement, on peut
considérer qu’il en a été de même chez l’homme.
Mots-clés
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Transmisión intra e interespecífica de virus H7N7 
de la influenza aviar altamente patógena 
durante la epidemia que asoló los Países Bajos en 2003 
M.C.M. de Jong, A. Stegeman, J. van der Goot & G. Koch
Resumen
La epidemia de virus H7N7 de la influenza aviar altamente patógena (IAAP) que
en 2003 sufrieron los Países Bajos fue probablemente causada por la
introducción de una cepa H7N7 de influenza aviar levemente patógena (IALP)
(por transmisión interespecífica a partir de aves salvajes) y la subsiguiente
transmisión intraespecífica de ese virus en las aves de corral. El virus H7N7 de
la IAAP resultante adquirió después gran eficacia en la transmisión
intraespecífica, tanto en una misma bandada como entre bandadas. A
consecuencia de ello, en las dos zonas de alta densidad avícola que resultaron
afectadas la única solución para atajar la epidemia fue eliminar a todas las aves
domésticas de la región. A juzgar por los modelos espaciales, ésas fueron las
dos únicas zonas de los Países Bajos donde ocurrió tal cosa. También hubo
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